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Abstract
Recent platforms, like Uber and Lyft, offer service to consumers via “self-scheduling” providers
who decide for themselves how often to work. These platforms may charge consumers prices
and pay providers wages that both adjust based on prevailing demand conditions. For example,
Uber uses a “surge pricing” policy, which pays providers a fixed commission of its dynamic
price. We find that the optimal contract substantially increases the platform’s profit relative
to contracts that have a fixed price or fixed wage (or both) and although surge pricing is not
optimal, it generally achieves nearly the optimal profit. Despite its merits for the platform,
surge pricing has been criticized in the press and has garnered the attention of regulators due
to concerns for the welfare of providers and consumers. However, we find that providers and
consumers are generally better off with surge pricing because providers are better utilized and
consumers benefit both from lower prices during normal demand and expanded access to service
during peak demand. We conclude, in contrast to popular criticism, that all stakeholders can
benefit from the use of surge pricing on a platform with self-scheduling capacity.
Keywords: self-scheduling capacity, peer-to-peer markets, contract design, dynamic pricing,
service operations, ride-sharing
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Introduction

The rise of the “sharing economy” has transformed the way firms can deliver service to consumers.
The firm no longer must centrally schedule its capacity by assigning workers to shifts. Instead,
∗
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workers may act as independent service providers who determine their own work schedules, and
the firm’s role becomes that of a platform which connects providers to consumers. (See Katz
and Krueger (2016) for data on the growth of alternative work arrangements in the United States.)
Although the platform has far less control over how many providers work at any one time, providers
gain the freedom to “self-schedule” the hours they work, presumably allowing them to better
integrate their work with the other activities in their lives (Hall and Krueger (2015)). To make
these new relationships viable, customers must be charged a reasonable fee and be adequately
served.
Examples of relatively new platforms that feature self-scheduling capacity include Uber and
Lyft for local transportation, and Postmates for local delivery. A potential provider for one of
these platforms must first make the long-term decision of whether to join the platform or not. This
decision has implications for several months or years, and providers join only if they expect to earn
more with the platform than with their next best alternative. If a person joins a platform as a
provider, then they must make short-term decisions about when and how often to work. These
decisions are made on a daily or hourly basis, so the participation decision is relevant over a much
shorter time interval than the joining decision. The participation decision is based in part on the
wage providers receive per service. It is also based on providers’ expectations of how likely they are
to get work, which is a function of the overall level of demand and the number of providers working
at that time on the platform. For example, an Uber driver may know that demand is higher on
rainy days but may also know that other drivers are more likely to drive as a consequence. What
matters to the provider is the amount of demand relative to the amount of offered capacity at a
particular time.
In this paper we focus on the contractual forms a platform could select to make a viable market
with self-scheduling capacity. We study a stylized model with the following features: (i) there exists
a large pool of potential providers, (ii) providers join the platform only if their rational expectation
of their earnings from participation on the platform exceeds the opportunity cost of their next best
activity, (iii) the platform sets a price for consumers, a wage paid to providers for work completed
and regulates the maximum number of providers who join the platform, (iv) the platform cannot
directly determine when providers work and, instead, the providers who joined the platform selfschedule their offered capacity, (v) demand varies in predictable ways (e.g., more consumers seek
transportation on a rainy evening), (vi) if the offered capacity exceeds demand, providers share the
available demand equally, but if the offered capacity is less than demand, then demand is randomly
rationed (i.e. all consumers are equally likely to receive the scarce service), and (vii) the platform’s
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price and wage can depend on the current level of demand.
There are two key features of the model that make this environment distinctive. First, providers
self-schedule their offered capacity. Consequently, even if the number of providers who have joined
the platform is sufficient to satisfy demand, it is possible that demand rationing can occur because
too few providers may choose to work. However, it is also possible that capacity rationing can
occur, because too many providers may choose to work leaving some underutilized. Both forms of
rationing represent costly inefficiencies for the platform. Second, the platform can offer demandcontingent prices and wages. Demand-contingent prices are often called dynamic prices. Uber and
Lyft employ versions of dynamic prices and wages called surge pricing and prime time respectively.
There is a large literature on dynamic prices, while the literature on dynamic wages is far less
extensive, and there is no work on the interaction between dynamic prices and dynamic wages.
The platform’s primary goal with the design of its contract is to maximize its profit. Doing so
requires a contract that assures providers that join sufficient expected profit. However, the contract
must not give providers too much of an incentive to participate, which could lead to an excess of
providers, nor too little incentive, which could entice too little participation from providers to
satisfy demand.
Although maximizing profit is a clear objective for the platform, it is not the platform’s only
concern. A number of controversies have emerged with this new business model. Some people
believe providers are not adequately compensated because they are not given benefits and rights
associated with being employees (Isaac and Singer (2015), Scheiber (2015)). Others worry that
customers are unfairly discriminated against as a result of dynamic pricing (Kosoff (2015), Stoller
(2014)). Consequently, with a view towards potential litigation and regulation, a platform should
be concerned with both provider and consumer welfare. In particular, it is important to understand
the degree to which there is a tension between maximizing the platform’s profit and the surplus
earned by the other relevant stakeholders, the providers and consumers.
We focus on five possible operating models, or contracts, for the platform. With the simplest
possible contract, called the fixed contract, the platform offers providers a fixed wage and charges
consumers a fixed price. Next, we consider contracts in which the the platform either chooses
dynamic prices (with a fixed wage), or dynamic wages (with a fixed price). We refer to the former
as the dynamic price contract and the later as the dynamic wage contract. A commission contract,
which resembles surge pricing used in practice, allows the platform to dynamically adjust both
prices and wages in response to demand, but imposes the contraint of a fixed commission, i.e., a
fixed ratio between the two. It has been argued that this constraint may substantially lower the
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platform’s profit (Economist (2014)). Finally, the platform’s optimal contract dynamically adjusts
both prices and wages without the constraint of a fixed commission. A closed form solution for
the optimal version of each of these contracts is unavailable, but we analytically determine how to
determine the optimal form of each contract with a single dimensional search over a bounded space.
In addition, we are able to analytically determine conditions under which a commission contract is
optimal for the platform. Via numerical analysis over the set of feasible and plausible parameters,
we compare profits, consumer surplus and provider surplus across all five contracts. Those results
are consistent with the analytical results derived from a special case of the model.
Beyond the contractual form, our framework allows us to explore the consequence of selfscheduling. As already discussed, self-scheduling imposes a challenge for the platform because
it can only regulate the level of participation through its contract rather than directly, as it would
with “central-scheduling.” However, self-scheduling provides a benefit to the providers: they can
work when it is most desirable for them to do so, rather than being forced to work at times the
platform dictates.
To preview our main results, we find that the optimal contract provides the platform substantially higher profit relative to the fixed contract and self-scheduling is a profitable arrangement
for the platform relative to central-scheduling. Although not optimal, the commission contract is
nearly optimal, and given its simplicity, this may explain its use in practice. We find that consumers indeed have a reason to be skeptical about dynamic pricing: relative to the fixed contract,
adding dynamic pricing (with a fixed wage) reduces consumer surplus. However, again relative
to the fixed contract, adding dynamic pricing and dynamic wages together generally can increase
consumer surplus even though that combination also maximizes the platform’s profit. It does so
when the fixed contract rations demand when demand is high. Thus, if the lack of dynamic prices
and wages leads to poor service for customers in high demand periods, then consumers actually
benefit from the introduction of dynamic pricing, like Uber’s surge pricing.

2

Literature Review

Our work is primarily connected to three domains in the existing literature: research on capacity
and pricing, revenue management models, and recent papers on peer-to-peer platforms and selfscheduling capacity. For simplicity and consistency, we refer to the various components in other
papers using the terms relevant for our model. For example, the “platform” is the organization
responsible for designing the market, “providers” generate capacity, “dynamic prices” are demand-
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contingent payments from consumers to the platform in exchange for service, and “dynamic wages”
are demand-contingent payments from the platform to providers.
There is a large number of papers in operations management that study both capacity and
pricing within the same model. In the price-setting newsvendor model, a single capacity and price
decision is made before demand uncertainty is resolved (see Petruzzi and Dada (1999) for a comprehensive review). In a supply chain setting, “wages” are used to align firm and provider incentives,
though a wage-only (traditionally referred to as price-only) contract cannot fully coordinate the
system (Perakis and Roels (2007), Cachon (2003)). Additional work considers dynamic prices (e.g.
van Mieghem and Dada (1999b)) or dynamic wages (e.g. Cachon and Lariviere (2001), and van
Mieghem and Dada (1999a)). Those papers generally have only a single provider, they do not
investigate the interaction between dynamic prices and dynamic wages, and they do not explore
welfare for all stakeholders. A separate body of work studies how a firm should manipulate its
short-term capacity via production given that it is restricted to charge a single price over a selling
horizon (e.g. Gilbert (1999, 2000)). In these papers the firm directly controls production, so there
is no consideration of wages. Several papers study competition among multiple providers and establish that competition can lead to excessive entry (e.g. Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Besanko,
Doraszelski, Lu, and Satterthwaite (2010)) and a platform should discourage competition to mitigate the losses in system value due to this issue (e.g. Bernstein and Federgruen (2005), Cachon
and Lariviere (2005)), but those papers do not consider dynamic wages or prices.
Dynamic prices, or prices that respond to updated information, are a central focus for the
revenue management literature (see Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006) and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak
(2003) for reviews). In many papers supply is assumed to be fixed, which means prices are set
over a (generally) finite horizon to maximize revenue. Some papers include supply (e.g. inventory)
decisions: e.g. Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994), Federgruen and Heching (1999), Thowsen (1975), and
Zabel (1970). Some work incorporates strategic consumer response to pricing (e.g. Su (2007), Aviv
and Pazgal (2008), and Cachon and Swinney (2009)), and a growing number of papers investigate
how pricing and supply decisions affect consumer surplus: e.g. Cohen, Lobel, and Perakis (2015),
Yu, Debo, and Kapuscinski (2013). Those papers assume a constant marginal cost of supply
and, more importantly, the platform directly controls supply. In our model the platform lacks
such control: the platform must make joining the platform attractive enough in the long run and
providers decide whether they want to work or not in the short run.
A set of papers considers peak-load pricing, the practice of charging higher prices during peak
periods of demand (e.g. Steiner (1957), Crew, Fernando, and Kleindorfer (1995), and Gale and
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Holmes (1993)). The primary motivation of peak-load pricing is to increase revenue by shifting
demand from the peak period to the off-peak period. We do not incorporate this capability into
our model. For example, consumers in need of transportation during a rainy evening are unable to
postpone their need to a time with better weather.
There is work on the value of dynamic prices in systems that experience congestion. Celik and
Maglaras (2008), Ata and Olsen (2009), and Kim and Randhawa (2015) each define a model with
a platform that serves stochastically arriving price sensitive consumers, but with fixed capacity.
Banerjee, Riquelme, and Johari (2015) considers the value of dynamic pricing in a model with
random arrivals of consumers and providers. Providers join based on their expectation of long run
earnings (as in our model) and are paid a fixed commission of the consumer price (whereas we
consider other wage structures). Prices are selected in the short-term in response to the length of
the queue of providers active in the market but waiting for work. Unlike us, they find that dynamic
pricing provides no benefit in terms of maximizing the platform’s expected profit or system welfare,
but they have a single demand regime whereas in our model some periods have predictably higher
demand than others for a given price.
Peer-to-peer service platforms have attracted significant academic interest; e.g. Kabra, Belavina, and Girotra (2015), Gefen and Carmel (2008), Hong and Pavlou (2014), Snir and Hitt (2003),
Moreno and Terwiesch (2014), and Yoganarasimhan (2013). Those papers investigate how to subsidize different market players to accelerate the growth of a peer-to-peer platform, whether consumers
have geographic preferences over providers, the influence of platform design on provider quality,
and how provider reputation impacts the market. We do not explore those issues: our providers
are ex-ante homogenous and do not build reputations.
There is modeling and empirical work on the competition between peer-to-peer service marketplaces and existing markets: Einav, Farronato, and Levin (2015), Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers
(2014), Seamans and Zhu (2013), Cramer and Krueger (2016), and Kroft and Pope (2014). We
do not directly consider the competition between the platform and incumbents. However, to the
extent that existing firms use fixed prices and wages, we show that they would be at a substantial
disadvantage relative to a platform that uses dynamic prices and wages.
Several papers (e.g. Hu and Zhou (2015) and Allon, Bassamboo, and Çil (2012)) explore the
process for matching providers to consumers when capacities are exogenous and all participants
have preferences for the match they receive (e.g. a courier prefers to be matched to a nearby
consumer). We do not consider matching because our consumers and providers are homogeneous,
so careful matching does not provide a benefit. However, we do consider rationing if supply exceeds
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demand or vice-versa.
Closest to our work are papers on self-scheduling capacity. Ibrahim and Arifoglu (2015) considers a model in which the platform chooses the number of providers and providers are either
assigned by the platform to work in one of two different periods or they self select which of the
two periods they work in. Consumer prices are implicitly assumed to be fixed and the arrival of
potential consumers is exogenous. Rationing of demand can occur via customer abandonment. Unlike in our model, the platform can directly control the number of providers in the system and all
providers must choose to work in one of the two available periods. Taylor (2015) studies a queuing
system in which a platform creates a market for service where arrivals of consumers and servers are
endogenously determined based on decisions to seek and provide service respectively. His model
does not consider dynamic prices or wages. Gurvich, Lariviere, and Moreno-Garcia (2015) studies
a model in which a platform directly chooses the number of available providers, the wage for each
provider who chooses to work, and a cap on the number of providers who are allowed to work: given
the platform’s prevailing wage, more providers may want to work than the platform wants. They
do not include dynamic pricing - in all versions of their model the platform selects a single price.
They also do not impose an earnings constraint for providers. Instead, they impose an exogenous
minimum wage. In our model providers decide whether to join the platform based on rational
expectations of future earnings.

3

Model

Figure 1: Timeline of events
As shown in Figure 1, the interaction between the platform, providers, and consumers occurs
over two stages, or periods. At the start of the first period the platform announces the terms
of trade, consisting of prices charged to consumers, wages paid to providers, and the maximum
7

number of providers allowed to join the platform. A large pool of potential providers then decides
whether to join the platform or not. We refer to this as the “joining” decision. This period
represents the providers’ long-term decision. With a ride-sharing platform such as Uber, period 1
would represent a provider’s decision to sign up for Uber instead of Postmates, for example. The
second period represents the short-term decisions to work on the platform or not. We refer to this
as the “participation” decision. For example, once on the platform, providers for Uber must decide
whether to offer their service during a particular day or even a particular hour. Consequently, the
participation decision is relevant over a much shorter time interval than the joining decision. Hence,
the provider expects to make many of these short-term decisions. For simplicity and without loss
of generality, we collapse these decisions into a single period, which we refer to as the short-term
period or the second period.
In period 1 a provider incurs an opportunity cost, c1 , for joining the platform and in period 2
the provider can earn a profit from participation on the platform. Hence a provider joins in period 1
only if the provider expects to earn in period 2 at least c1 . All providers share the same opportunity
cost, so either all are willing to join or none are. Our model approximates a market with a deep
pool of potential providers and a highly elastic supply curve: if expected earnings are less than c1 ,
then the number of interested providers drops substantially, but if greater than c1 , then there is an
ample number of interested providers. We suspect that incorporating heterogeneous opportunity
costs into the model would not effect our qualitative results, but it would substantially complicate
the search for optimal contracts.
There are two types of uncertainty. The first is each provider’s cost to participate on the
platform in period 2. For example, on some days participation might be costly (e.g. a child needs
to visit a doctor) while on other days participation isn’t costly (the provider has nothing else to
do that day). Each provider can anticipate in period 1 that they will incur a participation cost in
period 2, but they do not know what that cost will be. They learn their participation cost at the
start of period 2 before their participation decision. In particular, let c2 be a provider’s realized
participation cost in period 2. (Recall, period 2 is really the aggregation of many decisions, and
a provider’s participation cost can vary over these decisions.) The stochastic participation cost
is independently and identically distributed across providers with distribution G(c) and density
g(c), which are known at the start of period 1 at the time of the provider’s joining decision. We
assume G(c) is strictly increasing and differentiable, G(0) = 0, there does not exist a finite c such
that G(c) = 1, and g(c)/G(c) is decreasing, which is satisfied for log-concave distributions. Many
common distributions (e.g. uniform, exponential, normal, gamma) are log-concave (see Bagnoli
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and Bergstrom (2005) for additional details).
The demand level is the second type of uncertainty. Demand occurs only in period 2 and it
can be either “high” or “low”. For example, for a ride-sharing platform, “high” demand could
be a rainy evening on a holiday weekend, whereas “low” demand could be a warm Wednesday
evening. (Again, as period 2 represents the combination of many decisions, the demand state can
vary across time.) The platform and the providers can anticipate in period 1 that demand can be
either high or low, but they only learn the actual state of demand at the start of period 2, after their
joining decision but before their participation decision. Thus, providers make their joining decision
before either uncertainty is resolved, but they make their participation decision after observing
both demand and participation cost. Note, while each provider observes their own c2 , the platform
does not observe each provider’s participation cost, so only demand uncertainty is resolved for the
platform.
The platform faces a linear demand curve with an uncertain intercept. To be specific, demand
for the platform’s service is Dj = (aj − bpj )+ , where pj is the price charged to consumers, b is a
constant, and the demand state can either by low or high, aj ∈ {al , ah }, where al < ah . Let fj ,
j ∈ {l, h} be the probability of state j demand, where fl + fh = 1. Each participating provider can
serve up to a single unit of demand in period 2. The parameter b has no impact on the qualitative
results, so b = 1 is assumed throughout.
At the start of period 1 the platform announces the terms of trade for providers joining the
platform. The terms consist of (i) an upper bound, N, on the number of providers who can join (e.g.
Uber imposes a cap on the total number of drivers that can operate in a city), (ii) a price charged
to consumers in each demand state, pj , and (iii) a wage paid in each demand state to each provider
for service, wj . Because feasible contracts entice all potential providers to join the platform in the
first stage, N is exactly the number of recruited providers. The cap N is important - providers
recognize that their earnings are decreasing in the number of providers on the platform, so the
platform uses N to ensure that providers earn enough to justify the cost of joining the platform, c1 .
We say that the platform uses demand-contingent, or dynamic, prices if pl 6= ph . The platform can
also choose a single price no matter the demand state, i.e. pl = ph . The same applies for wages.
For a particular demand realization, price, and wage, it is possible that demand exceeds the
capacity of participating providers. In that case demand is randomly rationed: some demand is
not served while all participating providers serve one unit of demand. Alternatively, it is possible
that capacity exceeds demand. In that case capacity is rationed: participating providers utilizes
only a portion of their capacity. To be specific, let φj be a provider’s utilization in demand state
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aj , where φj is the fraction of capacity offered by the participating providers used to serve demand.
When demand is rationed, φj = 1, whereas when capacity is rationed, φj < 1.
A participating provider earns revenue φj wj in period 2. All providers with participation cost
φj wj or lower choose to participate, while providers unfortunate to have high participation costs
choose not to participate. Hence, N G(φj wj ) providers participate. We require that providers
make optimal decisions based on rational expectation regarding their earnings. (See Farber (2015)
and Chen and Sheldon (2015) for evidence that taxi drivers and Uber providers respectively make
decisions based on rational expectations to maximize their return.) Thus, in equilibrium

φj =



1



N G(wj ) ≤ aj − pj

aj −pj
N G(φj wj )

aj − pj ≤ N G(wj )

Note that in the second case with capacity rationing, i.e. aj −pj ≤ N G(wj ), a recursive relationship
determines the equilibrium utilization. This equilibrium utilization exists and is unique.
Let πj be a provider’s expected profit conditional on joining for a given demand state aj , wage
wj , and price pj :
Z

wj φj

πj = (wj φj − Ec2 [c2 |c2 ≤ wj φj ])G(wj φj ) =

G(c)dc
0

Let Π be a provider’s expected profit from joining the platform:
Π(p, w, N ) =

X Z
j∈{l,h}

wj φj


G(c)dc fj

0

For a given price, wage, and recruitment level, the platform expects to earn
U (p, w, N ) =

X

(pj − wj )φj N G(φj wj )fj

j∈{l,h}

The platform’s objective is to choose price, wage, and recruitment to maximize its expected profit
subject to the constraint that providers are willing to join the platform:
max U (p, w, N )

w,p,N

s.t. c1 ≤ Π(p, w, N )
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It is helpful for our analysis to implicitly define four parameters, w0 , w00 ,φ̄l , and c1 :
R w0
R w000

G(c)dc = c1

G(c)dcfh = c1
Rw
G(c)dcfl + 0 G(c)dcfh = c1
Ra
P
c̄1 = j∈{l,h} 0 j G(c)dcfj
0

R φ̄l w
0

The first, w0 , is the smallest wage that induces providers to join when they can assume that they are
assured to be paid w0 in either demand state in equilibrium. The second, w00 , is similar to w0 , except
this is the lowest wage that induces providers to join when they are assured to receive w00 payment
in the high demand state and no payment in the low demand state. (If al ≤ p, then there are no
customers to serve in the low demand state.) The third, φ̄l , which applies when w0 < w < w00 , is
the rational expectations equilibrium utilization when providers expect to be rationed in the low
demand state but not in the high demand state. The fourth, c1 , is the maximum joining cost that
allows for a positive surplus in the system (i.e., if c1 < c1 then a provider wouldn’t join the platform
even if she were the only provider on the platform and the platform allowed her to keep all of the
possible profit). As c1 < c1 means this market cannot function, we assume c1 < c1 throughout.
Beside its own profit, the platform may have an interest in consumer and provider surplus,
especially if the platform’s practices are potentially controversial, thereby motivating negative publicity, lawsuits, or government regulation. We measure consumer surplus under a linear stochastic
P
demand in a similar fashion to Cohen, Lobel, and Perakis (2015): CS = j∈{l,h} 0.5 min((aj −
pj )2 , (aj − pj )N G(φj wj ))f (aj ). Consumer surplus decreases in the prices charged and increases
in the number of consumers served. The latter depends on the number of providers that join the
platform, N , and the fraction of those recruited providers that decide to participate. Provider
surplus increases in the number of recruited providers and in those providers’ expected earnings.
If each provider earns exactly c1 conditional on joining (as is shown in each of the contracts we
consider), then total provider surplus is c1 N .
Although our model does not include direct competition from another platform or service, it
indirectly includes the effect of competition. For example, the joining cost c1 reflects the competition
for labor from other sources of employment (which may be very different than the platform’s
service). As the cost c1 rises, providers earn a larger share of system surplus to reflect their
greater opportunities outside of the platform. Consumers also have other options, which is why we
include price sensitive demand. However, future research could explicitly model the dynamics of
competition across multiple platforms.
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4

Contract Design

We focus on five contract designs that vary by the amount of flexibility given to the platform to
adjust its prices and wages in response to observed demand in period 2. A closed form solution for
the platform’s best version of each contract is unavailable, but the following five theorems indicate
that the platform’s optimal contract within each design can be found via a single dimensional search
over a bounded interval (even though each contract involves up to five decisions, a price and wage
for each demand state and the number of providers to allow on the platform). Proofs are available
in the appendix.

4.1

Fixed Contract

With the fixed contract the platform chooses a single per-service wage, w, to pay providers and a
single per-service price, p, to charge consumers. These quantities are independent of the realized
demand state. As a result, the platform is subject potentially to two inefficiencies: demand rationing
and capacity rationing. With demand rationing, the offered wage is too low to induce enough
providers to participate relative to realized demand, leaving some customers without service. With
capacity rationing, the offered wage is too high because too many providers participate relative
to realized demand. For a given contract, it is possible that demand is rationed in the high
demand state and capacity is rationed in the low demand state, as is illustrated in Figure 2. In
the low demand state, N G(φl w) providers participate, which exceeds demand, Dl = al − p. In the
high demand state, N G(w) providers participate, all are allocated a customer, but Dh − N G(w)
customers do not receive service, even though the number of providers on the platform, N, may be
adequate to serve all demand.
The fixed contract may not be able to earn a positive profit (given c1 < c1 ), but if it does so,
then Theorem 1 describes the optimal fixed contract for the platform, which can be divided into
two types: (i) the platform serves both demand states, or (ii) the platform only serves high demand.
There are two extreme versions of serving demand in both states. In the first, which we refer to as
the poor service version, capacity matches low demand, meaning that there is no capacity rationing
and providers are fully utilized in all states. However, while all customers are served in the low
demand state, in the high demand state ah − al of demand is lost. In the second version, which
we refer to as the poor utilization version, capacity matches high demand. Customers are fully
served in either state, but in the low demand state too many providers participate, chasing too
little demand, leading to capacity rationing.
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Figure 2: An example of demand and capacity rationing with a particular fixed contract.
Theorem 1. Conditional on earning a positive profit, the optimal fixed contract has one of the
following two characteristics:
1. The platform serves both demand states. In particular, w ∈ [w0 , min(al , w00 )],

p = max

al + w G(w)al − φ̄l G(φ̄l w)ah

,
2
G(w) − φ̄l G(φ̄l w)

!

N = (al − p)/ (φl G(φl w)), there is capacity rationing only in the low state (i.e. φl = φ̄l ≤ 1 and
φh = 1), and each provider’s joining constraint is binding, i.e. c1 = Π(p, w, N ).
2. The platform serves only high demand. In particular, w = min {w00 , ah }, al < p = (ah +w)/2,
N = (ah − p)/G(w), and participating providers are fully utilized, i.e. φh = 1.

4.2

Dynamic Wage Contract

With the dynamic wage contract the platform charges consumers a fixed price, p, but pays providers
a wage, wj , that depends on the demand state aj . Relative to the fixed contract, the dynamic wage
contract allows the platform to address the issue of capacity rationing due to excessive provider
participation. For example, suppose the platform’s fixed contract rations capacity in the low
demand state. The platform could lower its wage in the low demand state while leaving providers
no worse off; providers would be paid less but, because fewer providers participate, their utilization
would increase. Consequently, the platform’s profit would strictly increase. Alternatively, suppose
the platform’s fixed contract rations demand in the high demand state. This is the best fixed
contract when it is too costly to regulate provider participation with a single wage, so it is regulated
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by restricting recruitment in the first stage, N . However, because a demand-contingent wage gives
the platform a greater ability to regulate provider participation, the platform may no longer need
to rely exclusively on restricting recruitment, allowing higher N , thereby mitigating some demand
rationing. In fact, according to Theorem 2, the dynamic wage contract is capable of eliminating
capacity rationing in all demand states. However, the optimal dynamic wage contract may still
ration demand, which is why it may not be able to earn a positive profit.
Theorem 2. Conditional on earning a positive profit, the optimal dynamic wage contract has one
of the following two characteristics:
1. The platform serves both demand states. In particular, wl ∈ (0, w0 ],
Z

wl

Z

wh

G(c)dcfl +
0


p = max

G(c)dcfh = c1
0



ah G(wl ) − al G(wh )
al fh G(wh )wh + fl G(wl )wl
, min al , +
(G(wl ) − G(wh ))
2
2(fh G(wh ) + fl G(wl ))

N = (al − p) /G(wl ), there is no capacity rationing, i.e. φl = φh = 1, and each provider’s joining
constraint is binding, i.e. c1 = Π(p, w, N ).
2. The platform serves only high demand. In particular, wh = min {w00 , ah }, p = (ah + wh )/wh ,
N = (ah − p)/G(wh ), and participating providers are fully utilized, i.e. φh = 1.

4.3

Dynamic Price Contract

With the dynamic price contract, the platform selects a price for each demand state, pj , but
pays providers a fixed wage. The dynamic price contract enables the platform to manage demand
rationing. For example, suppose the best fixed contract has poor service. Capacity is restrictive
because higher capacity would lead to costly capacity rationing in the low demand state. However,
with dynamic prices the platform can increase its price in the high demand state without affecting
providers, thereby reducing demand rationing while increasing its revenue and profit. With the
other extreme, suppose the best fixed contract has poor utilization. In the high demand state, the
platform would prefer to raise the price further. But doing so would exacerbate the problem of
capacity rationing in the low demand state. Once the platform has the ability to charge dynamic
prices, it can indeed raise its price in the high demand state while also lowering its price in the
low demand state, both of which help to mitigate capacity rationing while still avoiding demand
rationing. Nevertheless, a positive profit is not always feasible.
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Theorem 3. Conditional on earning a positive profit, the optimal dynamic price contract has one
of the following two characteristics:
1. The platform serves both demand states. In particular, w ∈ [w0 , min(al , w00 )], pl = (al + w) /2,

ph = ah −G(w)N , N = (al − w) / 2φ̄l G(φ̄l w) , there is capacity rationing only in the low state, i.e.
φl = φ̄l ≤ 1, and φh = 1, and each provider’s joining constraint is binding, i.e. c1 = Π(p, w, N ).
There is no demand rationing.
2. The platform serves only high demand. In particular, wh = min {w00 , ah }, p = (ah + wh )/wh ,
N = (ah − p)/G(wh ), and participating providers are fully utilized, i.e. φh = 1.

4.4

Commission Contract

The commission contract, which resembles Uber’s surge pricing policy, adjusts both price and
wage in response to demand, but also imposes the constraint that the two have a constant ratio. In
particular, the platform charges a demand-contingent price, pj , and pays providers wj = βpj , where
β is the (fixed) commission rate. Given the market is viable (c1 < c1 ), there exists a sufficiently
high commission rate that enables the market to function and the platform to earn some profit.
For a given commission, there is a unique optimal wage schedule and recruitment level satisfying
the optimality conditions in the following theorem, but a line search is required to find the optimal
commission.
Theorem 4. For a given β ∈

h

w0
ah , 1

i
, the optimal fixed commission contract is uniquely defined,

earns a positive profit for the platform and satisfies:


1
pj = max aj − N G(ŵj ), aj
2 !
aj

φj = min 1,
2N G 21 βφj aj
Z
wj φj
X
c1 =
G(c)dcfj .
j∈{l,h} 0

where ŵj is uniquely defined by ŵj = β(aj − N G(ŵj )). The providers’ joining constraint is binding.
Capacity rationing is possible, but demand rationing does not occur.

4.5

Optimal Contract

The optimal contract allows the platform complete flexibility: both wages and prices may vary
according to the demand state without the constraint of a fixed ratio between the two. With these
two levers, the platform maximizes its profit, it eliminates both demand and capacity rationing, it
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always serves demand in all demand states, and it maximizes system surplus (the sum of platform
and provider expected profits).
Theorem 5. (i) The platform earns a positive profit with the optimal contract (for all c1 < c1 ),
(ii) the optimal contract is uniquely defined by wo , po , and N o satisfying,
wjo = aj − 2N o G(wjo )
o
poj = aj − NZo G(w
j)
wjo
X
G(c)dcfj
c1 =
j∈{l,h} 0

(iii) there is no capacity rationing, i.e. φol = φoh = 1, nor demand rationing, (iv) each provider’s
joining constraint is binding, i.e. c1 = Π(p, w, N ), and (v) system surplus (the sum of platform and
provider profits) is maximized.
For a given N , the system of the first two equations uniquely identifies prices and wages. A
search over N finds the contract that satisfies all three equations.
Unlike the commission contract, the optimal contract is not burdened with the constraint of a
fixed ratio between wage and price. Nevertheless, there are cases in which the optimal contract is a
commission contract (i.e., the commission contract is optimal for the platform). For example, the
optimal wage to price ratio,

wjo
wjo
= o
poj
wj + N o G(wjo )

is independent of the demand state (i.e., constant across states) if participation costs are uniformly
distributed (i.e., G(c) is linear in c). Alternatively according to Theorem 6, the commision contract
is optimal if joining costs are either very low or very high. To explain, when the joining cost,
c1 , approaches its upper bound c̄1 , the optimal contract gives nearly all revenue to providers in
order to recruit them. This is equivalent to a commission contract with β → 1. When c1 instead
approaches zero, the platform can recruit many providers and encourage enough participation with
a very small wage. In the limit, the optimal contract offers almost no wages, which is equivalent
to a commission contract with β → 0.
Theorem 6. The commission contract is optimal (i.e., yields the same profit for the platform as
the optimal contract) if (i) c1 → c̄1 or (ii) c1 → 0.
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5

Fixed Participation Cost

In this section we consider an specialized version of the main model in which, instead of heterogeneous and stochastic participation costs described by the distribution function G(·), all providers
have a fixed participation cost, c2 , in period 2. (i.e., G(c|c < c2 ) = 0 and G(c|c2 ≤ c) = 1.) All
other aspects of the main model remain. Hence, this fixed c2 model, retains most of the critical
features of the main model: e.g., providers act on rational expectations, and capacity and demand
rationing are possible. The primary difference is that the average participation cost conditional on
participation is independent of the number of joining providers, N, (i.e., it is always c2 ), whereas
in the main model it decreases in N (i.e., for the same desired number of participating providers,
increasing the pool of potential providers, N, results in a selection of providers with lower average
participation cost).
To conserve space, we focus on three contract types with the fixed c2 model: (1) a fixed contract,
(2) the optimal contract (i.e., dynamic prices and wages), and (3) the commission contract (i.e.,
dynamic prices and a fixed ratio between wage and price). With the fixed contract the platform
selects a fixed price and compensates the providers so that their joining constraint binds, i.e., they
each earn c1 . Hence, the fixed contract in this model is comparable to the fixed contract in the main
model.1 For notational convenience, let a = fl al + fh ah and ĉ = c2 + c1 /fh . Proofs and derivations
of results are available from the authors.
The objective of this section is to use the tractability of the fixed c2 model to derive analytically
(i) the conditions under which the optimal contract increases consumer surplus relative to the fixed
contract, and (ii) a lower bound for the platform’s profit with the commission contract relative to
the optimal contract. The numerical calculations in the subsequent section demonstrate that these
results carry over to the more general main model.
To begin the analysis, with the fixed contract it is optimal to adopt one of three versions as
described in Table 1. There are two extreme solutions that serve customers in both demand states:
in the “poor service” version, capacity matches low demand, thereby causing demand rationing
in the high demand state; while in the “poor utilization” version, capacity matches high demand,
thereby causing capacity rationing in the low demand state. In the third version only high demand
is served. Thus, it is never optimal for the platform to have both demand and capacity rationing.
The optimal contract, described in Table 2, serves both demand states and sets recruitment,
N, equal to high demand. To facilitate comparison with the commission contract, it is possible
1

This compensation can be achieved with a fixed wage for service (equal to c2 , so that all providers who participate
receive demand) and a fixed salary for joining the platform (equal to c1 , to ensure the joining constraint is satisfied).
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version

price, p

poor service:
p < al ,
N = al − p

al +c1 +c2
2

poor utilization:
p < al ,
N = ah − p
only high
demand: al < p,
N = ah − p

a+c1 +c2
2

ah +ĉ
2

platform profit,U
(al −c1 −c2
4

1
8

(a − c1 − c2 )2
−fl (ah − al ) c1
1
4

1
4 fh (ah

consumer surplus,S

)2

1
8

− ĉ)2



(a − c1 − c2 )2 − fh2 (ah − al )2

(a − c1 − c2 )2 +

1
2

1
8 fh (ah



fl a2l + fh a2h − a2



− ĉ)2

Table 1: Three possible versions of the optimal fixed contract in the fixed c2 model.

pl
ph
N
βl
βh
Uo
So

c1 ≤ fh (ah − al )
(al + c2 ) /2
(ah + ĉ) /2
(ah − ĉ) /2
2c2 / (al + c2 )
2ĉ/ (al + ĉ)
2
2
fl
fh
4 (al − c2 ) + 4 (ah − ĉ) 
2
2
1
8 fl (al − c2 ) + fh (ah − ĉ)

fh (ah − al ) < c1
1
2 (al + c1 + c2 − fh (ah − al ))
1
2 (ah + c1 + c2 + (1 − fh ) (ah − al ))
1
2 (ah − c1 − c2 − (1 − fh ) (ah − al ))
2 (c1 + c2 ) / (a + c1 + c2 )
2 (c1 + c2 ) / (a + c1 + c2 )
2
1
4 (fl al + fh ah − c1 − c2 )
1
8

(fl al + fh ah − c1 − c2 )2

Table 2: Contract terms (pl , ph , N, βl = wl /pl , and βh = wh /ph ), profits (Uo ) and consumer surplus
(So ) with the optimal contract for low (c1 ≤ fh (ah − al )) and high (fh (ah − al ) < c1 ) values of the
joining cost.
to describe the platform’s wage in terms of a demand-contingent commission: with low demand
the platform pays a commission βl = wl /pl , and with high demand it pays βh = wh /ph . If
c1 ≤ fh (ah − al ), then the amount of demand served in the low state is strictly less than the
amount served in the high state. In this case the wage/commission in the low state is chosen
to avoid excessive participation, leaving providers with zero earnings. (If the platform chooses
a higher wage in the low state then it merely induces more participation among the providers
without increasing their profit.) In the high demand state the wage/commission is selected so that
all providers are willing to participate and their earnings are just sufficient to justify joining the
platform. When the joining cost is higher, fh (ah − al ) < c1 , the platform equates the amount of
demand served in both states - providers are too costly to have some of them not serving customers
in the low demand state. In these settings the platform uses the same commission in both demand
states.
Now consider the issue of how consumer surplus compares between the fixed and optimal contracts. It can be shown analytically that whether the optimal contract increases or decreases
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pl
ph
N
β
Uβ

high demand
exceeds low demand
c2 /β
ĉ/β
ah − ph
2
2(fl c22 +fh ĉ2 )
fl c2 al +fh ĉah +fl c22 +fh ĉ2
(fl c2 (al −c2 )+fh ĉ(ah −ĉ))2
4(fl c22 +fh ĉ2 )

high demand equals low demand

1
2
1
2

1
2

(al + c1 + c2 − fh (ah − al ))
(ah + c1 + c2 + (1 − fh ) (ah − al ))
(ah − c1 − c2 − (1 − fh ) (ah − al ))
2 (c1 + c2 ) / (a + c1 + c2 )
1
4

(fl al + fh ah − c1 − c2 )2

only high
demand
ah +ĉ
2
ah −ĉ
2
2ĉ
ah +ĉ
(ah −ĉ)2
fh 4

Table 3: Contract terms (pl , ph , N, β = wl /pl = wh /ph ) and profits (Uβ ) with three potential
versions of the commission contract - each of these versions can be the best solution for the platform.
consumer surplus relative to the fixed contract depends on which version of the fixed contract
yields the highest profit for the platform (i.e., the version the platform would choose to implement). If the fixed contract involves demand rationing (either poor service or only high demand)
then consumers benefit from switching from the fixed contract to the optimal contract. In these
cases the fixed contract is unable to provide adequate supply and even though consumers pay more
in the high demand state with the optimal contract, the additional supply available with the optimal contract leads to higher consumer surplus. However, if the fixed contract rations capacity (the
poor utilization version), then consumers are worse off with a switch to the optimal contract. The
fixed contract rations capacity when capacity is relatively cheap, meaning a low joining cost, c1 .
The second issue is how the platform’s profit compare’s between the commission and optimal
contracts. To be specific, when does the commission contract perform poorly relative to the optimal
contract and by how much. Table 3 reports parameters and profits for three possible versions of the
commission contract. (A fourth possible version exists but it does not yield closed formed solutions.
This is not problematic for two reasons - it is the least likely of the versions to be optimal , and it
is not necessary to include in the derivation of a profit lower bound.)
Given that we are able to evaluate the entire parameter space for the fixed c2 model, we can
determine that the profit ratio Uβ /Uo is minimized when either c2 → 0 or c1 → 0. When c2 = 0
and 0 < c1 , the optimal contract chooses a low wage when demand is low (merely to induce
enough participation without allowing providers to earn a profit in that state) and, when demand
is high, chooses a sufficiently high wage to give providers enough profit (c1 /fh ) to justify joining the
platform. Thus, the optimal low demand commission, βl , is very small, whereas the high demand
commission, βh , is large. This disparity in the two commission rates creates a challenge for the fixed
commission contract, which is required to choose a single commission. With the other extreme,
c1 = 0 and 0 < c2 , the optimal policy chooses βh  βl . The joining constraint is not relevant (c1
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is low), so the focus for the optimal contract is on the participation constraint. Because pl < ph ,
the optimal commission with low demand is higher than with high demand. Again, the fixed
commission contract is restricted to a single commission. If that commission is set high enough to
induce participation with low demand, then it gives the providers too much profit when demand is
high. But if it is set to the level needed for participation with high demand, then there will be no
customers served when demand is low.
It is possible to analytically derive a lower bound (which is often tight) on the profit ratio:
min {Uβ /Uo } =

p 
1
1 + fh
2

Thus, the commission contract performs poorly when one of the two costs is very low (either
c1 or c2 ) and the probability of high demand is small. In the extreme, as fh → 0, the fixed
commission contract earns only 1/2 of the profit of the optimal contract. However, when the two
demand states are equally likely, the commission contract earns at least 85% of the optimal profit



p
(1/2) 1 + 1/2 .
Although there are cases in which the commission contract performs poorly relative to the
optimal contract, this does require rather special parameters. For example, consider cases in which
fh = 0.05, which yields a lower bound of Uβ /Uo = 0.612. Evaluation of 3,600 evenly spaced
observations throughout the feasible parameter space yields a minimum profit ratio close to the
lower bound, Uβ /Uo = 0.646. (The lower bound is not achieved because the extreme border
conditions c1 = 0 or c2 = 0 are not included.) However, the average ratio is Uβ /Uo = 0.995 and the
median ratio is Uβ /Uo = 1.000. We conclude that for the majority of parameters, the commission
contract yields nearly the optimal profit in the fixed c2 model. In the next section we report that
the analytical results from the fixed c2 model match the numerical analysis of the main model.

6

Numerical Study

To study the performance of the five contracts in our main model, we constructed 14,700 scenarios
with the goal to cover the set of feasible and plausible parameters. Table 4 summarizes the parameters used to create the scenarios. Without loss of generality, the demand intercept is set to
ā = fl al + fh ah = 100. The two demand states are al = δā and ah = (2 − δ)ā, which includes
from a minimal level of variance in demand outcomes (δ = 0.9) to nearly the maximal variance
(δ = 0.1). The probability of the low demand state ranges from a low of 0.05 to the high of 0.95.
(The fixed c2 model indicates that the fl and fh = 1 − fl probabilities are important for comparing
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the optimal and commission contracts.) In all scenarios the provider’s participation cost, c2 , is
Gamma distributed, with mean µ and standard deviation σ. The coefficient of variation of the participation cost ranges from a low 0.05 to a relatively high 1.5. The mean of the participation cost,
µ, is selected relative to the average demand intercept value, a, by adjusting G(a) to correspond to
a particular fractile of the distribution, ranging from 0.01 to 0.99. In the former case the average
participation cost is high relative to consumer willingness to pay, i.e., a  µ, whereas in the latter
case participation costs are relatively low, i.e., µ  a. Finally, the joining cost, c1 , spans the range
from a low value (0.05c̄1 ), to nearly its upper bound (0.95c̄1 ).
Parameters
δ
fl
σ/µ
G (a)
c1 /c1

Included values
{0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9}
{0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.95}
{0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 1.5}
{0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.99}
{0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.95}

Table 4: A summary of tested parameter values. All combinations of these values constitute 14,700
scenarios.
Table 5 reports on the frequency of different versions of the fixed contract. In 10.3% of the
scenarios the fixed contract is unable to earn a positive profit for the platform. (By construction,
because c1 < c1 , the optimal and commission contracts earn a positive profit in all scenarios.) In
the majority of scenarios (74.3%) the fixed contract serves only the high demand state - as the
fixed contract does not respond to demand, it can be better to focus on only one demand state
rather than trying to cater to both. (The optimal contract always serves both demand states.)
When the fixed contract serves both demand states (2,253 scenarios), it does so with one of the
two extreme versions identified in section 4.1. The poor service version is more common (73.8% of
2,253 scenarios) - capacity is set to the low demand state so that providers are fully utilized but
demand is rationed. The other extreme is the “poor utilization” version - capacity is set to the
high demand state, which never rations demand but leaves providers with poor utilization when low
demand occurs. As expected, the low capacity (poor service) version is more prevalent when the
joining cost, c1 , is high, otherwise the high capacity (poor utilization) version tends to be selected.
No scenarios were found which have both capacity and demand rationing. (This is always true in
the fixed c2 model.)
Table 6 reports on the profit performance of the four sub-optimal contracts relative to the
optimal contract in all 14,700 scenarios. In this table, and in the remaining discussion, we use the
subscripts f, w, p, β, and o to refer to the fixed, dynamic wage, dynamic price, commission and
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Version
“Poor utilization” - capacity equals
high demand, capacity rationing
occurs
“Poor service” - capacity equals low
demand, demand rationing occurs
Only the high demand state served
Neither state served - unable to
earn a positive profit

Number of scenarios
591

%
4.0%

1,662

11.3%

10,926
1,521

74.3%
10.3%

Table 5: Frequency of different versions of the fixed contract.

Minimum
5%
25%
50%
75%
95%
Maximum
Average

Uf /Uo
0.000
0.000
0.620
0.966
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.757

Uw /Uo
0.000
0.000
0.632
0.971
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.762

Up /Uo
0.000
0.000
0.752
0.981
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.791

Uβ /Uo
0.637
0.966
0.998
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.993

Table 6: Profit performance of the four suboptimal contracts relative to the optimal contract in all
14,700 scenarios. f, w, p, β, and o to refer to the fixed, dynamic wage, dynamic price, commission
and optimal contracts, respectively.
optimal contracts, respectively. On average, the fixed, dynamic wage and dynamic price contracts
perform poorly relative to the optimal contract, earning only on average 75.5%, 76.2% and 79.1%
of the optimal profit respectively. However, this is due to the very poor performance of a few
scenarios: the median performance of those three contracts is considerably better: 96.6%, 97.1%,
98.1%. Furthermore, while the dynamic wage and the dynamic price contracts perform better than
the fixed contract, their incremental performance on average is not substantial. This suggests that
in this context it is insufficient to operate dynamically only on one dimension (price or wage). In
contrast, while the commission contract is not optimal, its performance is nearly optimal - the
average profit earned with the commission contract is 99.3% of the optimal profit and with 95% of
the scenarios the commission contract earns at least 96.6% of the profit of the optimal profit. (A
similar result is obtained in the fixed c2 model.) However, there are a few scenarios in which the
commission contract performs poorly - in the worst scenario the commission contract earns only
63.7% of the optimal profit. That performance is close to the analytical lower bound from the fixed
√

c2 model for these scenarios, Uβ /Uo = 21 1 + 0.05 = 0.612.
Table 7 focuses on the subsample of 2,253 scenarios in which the fixed contract serves demand
in both states. These scenarios are considered to be less extreme (and therefore more plausible)
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Minimum
5%
25%
50%
75%
95%
Maximum
Average

Uf /Uo
0.000
0.046
0.460
0.738
0.904
0.976
0.995
0.652

Uw /Uo
0.000
0.046
0.475
0.792
0.943
0.988
0.997
0.680

Up /Uo
0.005
0.326
0.797
0.939
0.983
0.997
0.999
0.844

Uβ /Uo
0.824
0.970
0.997
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.994

Table 7: Profit performance of the four suboptimal contracts relative to the optimal contract in the
2,253 scenarios in which the fixed contract serves both demand states. f, w, p, β, and o to refer to
the fixed, dynamic wage, dynamic price, commission and optimal contracts, respectively.
because the variance in demand is not so large and provider cost is not so high as to cause the
platform to restrict attention exclusively to a single demand state (i.e., in the 12,447 scenarios not
included in the table the fixed contract earns the same profit whether the low demand state exists
or not). In this sample, three of the sub-optimal contracts perform worse than in the broader
sample. Adding only dynamic wages to the fixed contract provides only a marginal improvement,
whereas adding only dynamic pricing boosts the platform’s profit considerably. However, there
are substantial losses in profit even with dynamic pricing. In contrast, the commission contract
improves its performance in this sample, in particular its worst case performance is better (yielding
82.4% of optimal profit).
The overall conclusions from Tables 6 and 7 are (i) it is insufficient to dynamically adjust only
wage or only price, i.e., the platform should adjust both price and wage in response to demand and
(ii) although the commission contract constrains the platform with the requirement of a fixed ratio
between wage and price, the platform is nevertheless able to earn nearly the optimal profit in the
vast majority of scenarios.
It is worth emphasizing that the fixed contract performs poorly relative to the optimal contract
(or the commission contract) because it charges too little during high demand and it charges too
much during low demand. The popular press likes to emphasize higher prices, but it is important to
recognize that a fixed price leads to poor utilization among providers during low/normal demand
and that destroys some value in the system, value that can be recaptured through the use of
dynamic pricing. Thus, while consumers may (understandably) dislike the elevated prices paid
during high demand, they should appreciate the benefit of paying a lower price when low/normal
demand prevails.
To explore a bit further the finding that the commission contract generally performs very well
relative to the optimal contract, Table 8 reports the correlation between the profit ratio of the
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Uβ /Uo

δ/a
0.13

fl
-0.19

σ/µ
0.31

G (a)
0.03

c1 /c1
0.22

Table 8: Correlations between scenario parameters and the profit ratio of the commission and
optimal contracts, Uβ /Uo , in the 2,253 scenarios in which the fixed contract serves both demand
states.
two contracts, Uβ /Uo , and the other parameters. As expected, the commission contract does best
when there is less variability in demand (i.e., δ is high): the commission contract is identical to
the optimal contract if there is no variability in demand. Consistent with the analytical results
obtained from the fixed c2 model, the profit ratio Uβ /Uo is lowest when c1 is low and fl = 1 − fh
is high. Finally, the commission contract performs poorly when the coefficient of variation of the
participation cost, c2 , is smallest, which suggests that the lower bound for Uβ /Uo derived from the
fixed c2 model (which has zero variation in c2 ) should provide a suitable bound even in the main
model. Furthermore, it emphasizes that the commission contract is most effective in environments
in which providers really want to work on some days, don’t want to work on other days, and their
is no consistent pattern to those days across time.
Although the commission contract is nearly optimal in the vast majority of cases, it is worth
asking if there exists another simple contract that might perform even better. One option is a
membership fee contract that has been applied in several industries (Rochet and Tirole (2006))
and has been specifically suggested for ride-sharing (Economist (2014)). With a membership fee
contract the platform sets dynamic prices, providers keep all of the revenue they earn (as in a 100%
commission) and the platform earns revenue by charging providers a fixed fee to join the platform.
Providers join the platform only if their earnings net of the joining fee exceeds their requirement, c1 ,
and participation behavior continues to be governed by rational expectations. Unfortunately, with
the membership contract there is not a mechanism to limit excessive participation in the low demand
state, which is an important feature of the commission and optimal contracts. Consequently, there
can be a considerable loss in system value and that limits the platform’s potential earnings. Let
Um be the platform’s best profit with the membership fee contract. In our preferred sample of
2,253 scenarios, the median ratio of the platform’s profit with the membership fee contract to the
optimal profit, Um /Uo , is only 0.858 and the lowest ratio is 0.565. (The analogous ratios for the
entire sample are 0.964 and 0.531.) Thus, the membership fee contract is not a suitable alternative
to the commission contract. (Details to evaluate the membership fee contract are available from
the authors.)
Turning to consumer surplus, we use the fixed contract as the benchmark. Tables 9 and 10
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provide consumer surplus results for the set of scenarios with poor utilization or poor service with
the fixed contract. The impact of adding a dynamic component to the fixed contract depends
starkly on which component is made dynamic. If dynamic wages are added to the fixed contract,
then consumers are always better off (i.e., 1 < Sw /Sf in all cases). To explain, the fixed contract
with poor utilization mitigates the capacity rationing in the low demand state by constraining
recruitment. Restricting recruitment limits the excess participation in the low demand state that
causes capacity rationing. Once a dynamic wage is allowed, the platform can mitigate capacity
rationing in the low demand state by lowering the wage in that state. This enables the platform
to increase recruitment, which is beneficial to consumers. Similarly, the fixed contract with poor
service substantially restricts recruitment to eliminate capacity rationing. But then a considerable
amount of demand rationing occurs in the high demand state. The addition of dynamic wages
allows the platform to increase the number of recruited providers while ensuring that providers
continue to be fully utilized in both demand states. The increase in recruitment again benefits
consumers.
Although adding dynamic wages is beneficial to all stakeholders, the same cannot be said of
dynamic prices (i.e., Sp /Sf < 1 in all cases). This is particularly evident with the fixed contract
with poor service (Table 10). In this case, dynamic prices can address demand rationing without
changing recruitment or the wage: the platform simply increases the price in the high demand
state so that demand in both states matches the number of providers willing to participate under
the fixed wage. The same number of consumers are served, but the high price screens consumers
by their willingness to pay, improving platform profit, but lowering consumer surplus. (Better
screening improves consumer surplus, but always by less than the loss of consumer surplus due to a
higher price.) Dynamic prices are also problematic for consumers with the fixed contract with poor
utilization (Table 9). In this case the fixed contract selects an intermediate wage and price which
results in too little demand in the low demand state and too much demand in the high demand
state. The addition of dynamic prices allows the platform to let its prices diverge - a low price
in the low demand state and a high price in the high demand state. Increasing price in the high
demand state reduces the maximum demand, so the platform can offer a smaller wage and recruit
fewer providers. Neither the reduction in available supply nor the higher price benefits consumers.
The optimal contract combines the dynamic wage contract, which is good for consumers, with
the dynamic price contract, which is bad for consumers. Consequently, the optimal contract presents
a mixed results for consumers, but one with a clean demarcation - consumers are better off with the
optimal contract if the fixed contract chooses the poor service version (Table 10) and consumers
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fractile
Minimum
5%
50%
95%
Maximum

Sw /Sf
1.001
1.003
1.025
1.130
1.234

Sp /Sf
0.333
0.541
0.854
0.975
0.986

Sβ /Sf
0.723
0.780
0.957
0.992
0.994

So /Sf
0.706
0.777
0.956
0.992
0.994

Nw /Nf
0.847
0.871
0.995
1.043
1.099

Np /Nf
0.539
0.686
0.911
0.985
0.989

Nβ /Nf
0.603
0.748
0.945
0.989
0.993

No /Nf
0.629
0.756
0.946
0.989
0.994

Table 9: The ratio of consumer surplus and number of providers with the dynamic wage, dynamic
price, commission or optimal contract to the fixed contract in the 591 scenarios with poor utilization.
fractile
Minimum
5%
50%
95%
Maximum

Sw /Sf
1.000
1.002
1.053
1.580
2.644

Sp /Sf
0.001
0.115
0.716
0.952
0.976

Sβ /Sf
1.001
1.005
1.138
3.962
190.175

So /Sf
1.001
1.005
1.128
3.912
190.016

Nw /Nf
1.000
1.000
1.025
1.336
1.975

Np /Nf
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.944

Nβ /Nf
1.014
1.028
1.283
6.335
360.601

No /Nf
1.015
1.029
1.298
6.378
360.491

Table 10: The ratio of consumer surplus and number of providers with the dynamic wage, dynamic
price, commission or optimal contract to the fixed contract in the 1,662 scenarios with poor service.
are worse off with the optimal contract if the fixed contract chooses the poor utilization version
(Table 9). The fixed c2 model analytically yields the same result.
The commission contract provides nearly the same consumer surplus as the optimal contract,
which is to be expected given that the two contracts yield similar surplus (i.e., profit) for the
platform. Furthermore, as the poor service version of the fixed contract is more likely as the
joining cost increases, it is expected that consumer surplus with the commission contract is more
likely to increase relative to the fixed contract when the selected commission rate is high because
the platform offers a high commission generally when providers incur high joining costs. Figure 3
confirms this intuition. The figure plots consumer surplus with the commission contract relative
to the fixed contract (y-axis) as a function of the selected commission (x-axis). While there is
variation, the general pattern is clear - as the commission rate increases, consumers are more likely
to be better off with the commission contract than the fixed contract. As a point of reference,
ride-sharing platforms tend to offer an 80% commission. Among the 864 scenarios that select a
commission of 80% or higher, consumers surplus with the commission contract is higher than with
the fixed contract in 859 scenarios (or 99.4% of them) and always higher whenever the commission
is 82% or higher.
Tables 9 and 10 also report on provider surplus, which equals N c1 with all contracts. Thus,
provider surplus is determined by the number of providers who join the platform, N. As with
consumers, whether providers are better off from a switch from the fixed contract to the optimal or
the commission contract depends on which of the two versions of the fixed contract is adopted. The
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Figure 3: The ratio of consumer surplus with the commission contract to consumer surplus with the
fixed contract as a function of the commission earned by providers with the commission contract
in the 2,253 scenarios in which the fixed contract serves both demand states. Red squares indicate
the average ratio for scenarios grouped by the commission contract commission in 0.05 intervals.
poor utilization version of the fixed contract recruits too many providers relative to the optimal, so
the optimal contract reduces the number of providers, decreasing their total surplus. In contrast,
the poor service version of the fixed contract does not recruit enough providers, so total provider
surplus increase with a switch to the optimal (or commission) contract.

7

Self-Scheduling vs. Central-Scheduling of Capacity

Self-scheduling capacity is a relatively new business practice. Traditionally, the platform decides
how many and which providers participate, a practice we call “central-scheduling.” The key advantage of central-scheduling is that it allows the platform to eliminate the inefficiency of capacity
rationing: the platform would never choose to have more providers working than necessary as that
lowers the providers’ earnings, making recruiting them more costly. It can also assist with demand
rationing: if the number of providers on the platform exceeds demand, then all demand can be
served. However, the key limitation of central-scheduling is that the platform does not observe the
providers’ participation costs. It would simply be too costly to credibly learn the details of every
provider’s planned outside activities at every possible moment. Consequently, when the platform
use central-scheduling, it can regulate the number of providers who participate, but it must select a
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random sample of providers, which may not be the set with the lowest participation costs. Providers
anticipate that they may be scheduled to participate at less than ideal times, which affects their
decision to join the platform.
In our model with central-scheduling the platforms selects the number of providers who participate, Kj , for each realization of available demand where Kj is bounded by recruitment, i.e.
Kj ≤ N . Participating providers earn wj φj − c2 and have a Kj /N chance of being selected to
participate. Recall that µ is the mean participation opportunity cost. Providers maintain their autonomy in the long-run first period. Hence, to recruit providers the platform must still compensate
them for their participation costs. The platform’s problem is then
max

X

K,w,p,N

(pj − wj )φj Kj fj

j∈{l,h}

s.t. Π ≥ c1
N ≥ Kj ∀j

(1)

where the providers’ expected profit from joining the platform is
Π=

X

(wj φj − µ)

j∈{l,h}

Kj
fj
N

Theorem 7. The platform earns higher profit and providers earn higher surplus with self-scheduling
than with central-scheduling of capacity.
The platform and providers are worse off with central-scheduling because exerting direct control
over provider participation increases the average provider’s opportunity cost, making recruitment
more difficult. The downside of self-scheduling for the platform is that it may lead to demand or
capacity rationing. However the combination of dynamic wages and dynamic prices in the optimal
contract eliminates both of those inefficiencies. Hence, the problem of self-scheduling can be fixed
via the contractual form, but the downside of central-scheduling cannot be corrected.
This result stands in contrast to Gurvich, Lariviere, and Moreno-Garcia (2015), which shows
that self-scheduling is less profitable for a platform than central-scheduling. Unlike Gurvich, Lariviere, and Moreno-Garcia (2015), in our model providers make joining decisions based on rational
expectations of their future earnings. This forces the platform to internalize the costs faced by
providers. Hence, because providers value the flexibility of self-scheduling, so does the platform.
Using our sample of 14,700 scenarios from the numerical study, Table 11 illustrates the magnitude of the loss that a platform incurs from central-scheduling instead of self-scheduling. On
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G(a)
0.01
0.10
0.40
0.80
0.99

0.05
0.53
0.57
0.63
0.74
0.82

Uc /Uo
σ/µ
0.25 0.5
0.17 0.02
0.23 0.09
0.28 0.15
0.42 0.30
0.65 0.60

1
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.21
0.59

1.5
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.16
0.60

0.05
0.49
0.53
0.59
0.70
0.76

0.25
0.15
0.21
0.26
0.40
0.58

Nc /No
σ/µ
0.5
0.02
0.08
0.14
0.29
0.54

1
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.22
0.55

1.5
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.19
0.57

Table 11: The ratio of profit, Uc /Uo , and provider recruitment, Nc /No between the optimal contract
with central-scheduling (“c” subscript) and self-scheduling (“o” subscript) in the 14,700 scenarios
of the numerical study. σ/µ is the coefficient of variation of a provider’s participation cost, c2 . G(a)
influences the distribution of participation cost relative to consumer willingness to pay - when G(a)
is small, the average participation cost, µ, is high relative to consumer willingness to pay, whereas
when G(a) is high, the average participation cost is low relative to consumer willingness to pay.
average, the platform’s optimal profit with central-scheduling, Uc , is only 35.7% of the optimal
profit with self-scheduling providers, Uo . Providers are also worse off by a considerable amount Nc /No is 33.6% on average. That said, there is considerable variation in the performance of centralscheduling. As intuition suggests, the penalty associated with central-scheduling is smaller when
the providers experience less variability in their participation cost (σ/µ is small) and the average
participation cost is small relative to consumer willingness to pay (G(a) is large). Nevertheless,
even in these scenarios, on average the platform and providers earn substantially less on average
than they would with self-scheduling.

8

Conclusion

We study a platform that offers a service via a pool of independent providers. Providers selfschedule when they offer their service to the customers on the platform and decide whether or not
to join the platform based on their earnings expectations. Demand varies over the long-term but is
predictable in the short-term. For example, demand is known to be high or low based on observable
factors like the time of the week or the current weather. Two inefficiencies can arise: (i) demand
can be rationed either because too few providers join the platform or too few choose to participate;
and (ii) capacity can be rationed because competition for a limited number of jobs leads too many
providers to participate. Demand rationing is costly because some customers are unable to access
the service that they value at the price charged, and the customers that do get the service might
not be the ones that value it the most. Capacity rationing is costly because participating providers
are not fully utilized but still incur their full opportunity cost of joining the platform.
Although self-scheduling removes some control from the platform (it cannot directly control
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the number of providers who work), it allows providers to self-select when it is most beneficial for
them to work. We show that this additional flexibility is beneficial to providers, the platform and
consumers.
We study several contractual forms that vary in whether prices and/or wages respond to demand. The most basic contract, the fixed contract, sets a single price and wage no matter what
demand level occurs. To the fixed contract the platform could add either dynamic wages or dynamic
prices. The optimal contract requires that the plaform chooses both a price and a wage contingent
on demand. We find that adding one dynamic component to the fixed contract (either wage or price
but not both) increases the platform’s profit but still leaves the platform with substantially lower
profit than what it could earn with the optimal contract, which is dynamic in both components.
We also consider a commission contract that chooses both price and wage dynamically, but with
the added constraint of a fixed ratio between the two. The commission contract mimics pricing
used in practice, such as Uber’s surge pricing. Our main result is that even though the commission
contract is not optimal, it yields nearly the optimal profit for the platform in the vast majority of
plausible scenarios. Consequently, it is probably sufficient for a platform to offer providers a fixed
commission and to then dynamically only adjust the price charged to consumers.
While maximizing profit is clearly an important objective for the platform, it isn’t the only
relevant one. A considerable amount of controversy has arisen over whether self-scheduling providers
should be treated like employees (e.g. given additional rights and benefits) and whether surge
pricing gouges consumers. Hence, a platform should also be concerned with how it influences
both provider and consumer surplus. We find that dynamic wages eliminate the inefficiency of
capacity rationing, and thus additional supply is provided to the system. With more providers,
more customers are served, leaving both providers and consumers better off. In contrast, consumers
should be wary of dynamic pricing on its own. Relative to the fixed contract, adding dynamic prices
while keeping the wage fixed reduces consumer welfare.
Given that dynamic pricing and dynamic wages work in opposite directions, the optimal contract
leads to ambiguous welfare implications, which depend on how the fixed contract manages demand
and capacity. If providers are relatively inexpensive (i.e. their opportunity cost to join the platform
is low), then the fixed contract recruits an ample number of providers and underutilizes them
during low demand periods. Adding dynamic prices and wages to that situation always works
to the disadvantage of providers and consumers because the platform recruits fewer providers
and, in the high demand state, charges more and serves fewer customers. However, if providers
have a high opportunity cost, then the fixed contract recruits a limited number of providers and
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forces customers during peak demand to suffer through poor service. In those cases, providers and
consumers are better off with the introduction of dynamic prices and wages: capacity expands to
serve more customers in all demand states. To frame this in the context of ride-sharing, if with the
fixed contract (e.g. taxis) it is hard to find service at peak demand times (e.g. a rainy evening),
then Uber’s introduction of surge pricing (i.e., dynamic pricing and wages) is likely to make all
stakeholders (Uber, drivers, and consumers) better off.
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9.1

Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1

With a fixed contract the platform chooses p, w, and N . Price can be selected from one of two
regions, corresponding to whether demand is served in both demand states or only in the highdemand state: p < al and al ≤ p < ah . We consider each region separately. Suppose p < al . The
platform’s expected profit is




(p − w)G(w)N
G(w)N ≤ al − p



U = (p − w)((al − p)fl + G(w)N fh ) al − p ≤ G(w)N ≤ ah − p





(p − w)((al − p)fl + (ah − p)fh ) ah − p ≤ G(w)N
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and the utilization of a provider is implicitly defined by φj = min{1, (aj − p)/N G(φj w)}. The
provider’s expected profit conditional on joining in period 1 is Π,

Rw



G(c)dc


 0
R φl w
Rw
Π=
G(c)dcfl + 0 G(c)dcfh
0




R φl w G(c)dcf + R φh w G(c)dcf

l
h
0
0

G(w)N ≤ al − p
al − p ≤ G(w)N ≤ ah − p
ah − p ≤ G(w)N

The optimal contract does not exist exclusively in the first domain of the provider profit function.
To explain, suppose G(w)N < al − p were optimal. Then the platform’s profit strictly increases
in N while the provider’s profit is independent of N , so N must be at least (al − p)/G(w). The
optimal solution does not exist exclusively in the third domain of the provider profit function. To
explain, suppose ah − p < G(w)N . Utilization, φj , is decreasing in N , so decreasing N allows w to
be decreased, strictly increasing U . So N must be at most (ah − p)/G(w).
Given the optimal contract is in the second domain of U , the platform’s profit is strictly increasing in N . This implies that either the provider profit constraint binds, c1 = Π, or the upper
bound on the feasible region binds, N G(w) = ah − p. If the former is not true but the latter is,
i.e. c1 < Π and N G(w) = ah − p , then the platform’s profit is strictly decreasing in w. As φl w
is increasing in w, a reduction in w is feasible (because c1 < Π ), which increases platform profit,
which leads to a contradiction. Thus, if the optimal solution has p < al , then it must be that
al − p = N φ̄l G(φ̄l w), which, when substituted into U and the feasible region constraint yields

U = (p − w)(al − p) fl +

G(w)
fh
φ̄l G(φ̄l w)


(2)

and
p̄ =

G(w)al − φ̄l G(φ̄l w)ah
 ≤p
G(w) − φ̄l G(φ̄l w)

(3)

As the platform profit (2) is concave in p, the optimal price, subject to the constraint (3), is
p = max ((al + w)/2, p̄). which satisfies the p < al constraint as long as w < al . To satisfy the
0 ≤ φ̄l ≤ 1 constraint, it must be that w0 ≤ w ≤ w00 . Thus, a search over w ∈ [w0 , min (w00 , al )]
finds the optimal wage.
Suppose al < p < ah . The provider joining constraint is

Rw
0

G(c)dcfh ≥ c1 . The platform’s

expected profit is
U=



(p − w)G(w)N fh

0 < G(w)N ≤ ah − p


(p − w)(ah − p)fh

ah − p ≤ G(w)N
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If ah − p < G(w)N , then the platform’s profit is strictly decreasing in w, so at optimal G(w)N ≤
ah − p. In this regime, U is strictly increasing in N, so it must be that G(w)N = ah − p. Therefore,
U = (p−w)(ah −p)fh , which is strictly concave in p, so the optimal price is p = max{(ah +w)/2, al }.
With either price, the platform’s profit is strictly decreasing in w, so with the optimal contract the
optimal wage is w = w00 because that is the wage, by definition, that results in Π = c1 .

9.2

Proof of Theorem 2

See technical appendix.

9.3

Proof of Theorem 3

See technical appendix.

9.4

Proof of Theorem 5

We show that the optimal contract is equivalent to the contract that maximizes system surplus
(the sum of platform and provider profit) The platform selects a price pj and a wage wj for each
demand state aj to maximize system surplus. Although the platform makes two decisions for each
demand state, it is possible to reduce this to a single decision because it is never optimal to choose
a price/wage combination such that demand doesn’t exactly match supply: if demand exceeds
supply, system profits can be increased by raising the price; and if demand is less than supply,
system profit can be increased by decreasing the wage. Hence, for any demand state aj , the price
and wage selected must satisfy N G(wj ) = aj − pj . Let Sj (pj (wj ), wj ) be the system’s expected
profit given a wage and demand realization:
Z
Sj (pj (wj ), wj ) = (aj − pj )(pj − wj ) + N

wj

Z
G(c)dc = N G(wj )(aj − N G(wj ) − wj ) + N

0

wj

G(c)dc
0

The system’s expected profit, including the cost of having N providers join, is S(wj , N ) = Sl (wl )fl +
Sh (wh )fh − N c1 . Because Sj (wj ) is quasi-concave, there exists a unique wj∗ that maximizes system
profit for each demand state aj : wj∗ + 2N G(wj∗ ) = aj , which is decreasing in N . Changing N affects
system surplus:
dS
dN

=

P 
j



R w∗
P R w ∗
G(wj∗ )(aj − 2N G(wj∗ ) − wj∗ ) + 0 j G(c)dc fj − c1 = j 0 j G(c)dc fj − c1
.
P ∂wj∗
∂2S
∗ )f < 0
=
G(w
j j
j ∂N
∂N 2
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Thus, system profit is concave in N and there exists a unique N ∗ that maximizes system profit.
With N = N ∗ providers earn their minimum profit, i.e. Π(N ∗ ) = c1 . It follows that the system
optimal solution is also the contract that maximizes the platform’s profit subject to Π ≥ c1 . Finally,
a series of substitutions yields p∗j = wj∗ (1 + N G(wj∗ )/wj∗ ).
The optimal contract yields a bound on the largest feasible provider reservation price. As c1
becomes large, the platform extracts all surplus from consumers by charging poj → aj and passes
all profit to providers via wjo → aj . The platform earns weakly positive profit and providers earn
R aj
P
j∈{l,h} 0 G(c)dcfj . Then the largest c1 for which the platform can feasibly operate is
c̄1 =

X Z

aj

G(c)dcfj .

(4)

j∈{l,h} 0

9.5

Proof of Theorem 4

Let wages be a fixed commission, β, of price, i.e. wj = βpj . As before, a provider’s expected
Rw φ
payoff for realization aj conditional on joining is Πj = 0 j j G(c)dc, where utilization in state j
is implicitly defined by φj N G(φj wj ) = (aj − wj /β). Let ŵj be the unique wage that matches
supply and demand, i.e. ŵj = β(aj − N G(ŵj )). The platform’s expected profit for wj ≤ ŵj is
Uj = (1/β − 1)wj N G(wj ), which is increasing in wj . Hence, the optimal wage is at least ŵj . The
platform’s expected profit for wj > ŵj is U = (1/β − 1)wj (aj − wj /β), which is concave in wj .
Thus, the profit maximizing wage is for a given aj is max{w̃j , ŵj }, where w̃j = βaj /2.
Now consider the platform’s optimal recruitment for a given commission. The optimal wage
schedule is a function of recruitment: ŵj ≤ w̃j if and only if N G(ŵj ) ≤. aj /2 ≤ N G(ŵj ) is an
increasing function of N :


βN g(ŵj )
∂N G(ŵj )
= G(ŵj ) 1 −
≥0
∂N
βN g(ŵj ) + 1
Define N̄j > 0 to be the unique recruitment threshold for which ŵj < w̃j if and only if N̄j < N
and define provider utilization given wage w̃j to be φ̃j = aj /2N G(φ̃j w̃j ). Then expected profit of
a provider for a given aj is

R

 w̃j φ̃j G(c)dc, N̄j < N
0
Πj = R

 ŵj G(c)dc,
N̄j ≥ N
0
Notice w̃j φ̃j is a decreasing function of N , so Πj is a monotonically decreasing function of N . In
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contrast, the platform’s expected profit from a realization aj is a weakly increasing function of N :

Uj =



(1 − β)a2 /4,
j

N̄j < N


(1/β − 1)ŵj (aj − ŵj /β),

N̄j ≥ N

It follows that the platform chooses recruitment so that Π =

P

j∈{l,h} Πj fj

= c1 .

It remains to search over β. Because wj is decreasing in both N and β, we may find an lower
bound on β from maxj wj (N = 0) = ŵh (N = 0) = βah ≥ w0 . Search for the profit maximizing
commission on the interval [w0 /ah , 1].

9.6

Proof of Theorem 6

See technical appendix.

9.7

Proof of Theorem 7

See technical appendix.
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